St. John's Law Review
Volume 43, January 1969, Number 3

Article 29

Collateral Estoppel: Glaser Doctrine No Longer Followed in First
Department
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1969 ]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

45 days of the demand.9 3 Prior to the 1967 amendment of 3216,
the law was unsettled as to whether a written demand was required
where the ground for dismissal was "general delay," or whether it
was required only where the ground was failure to file a note of
issue.94 Clearly, under present law, a demand is necessary in either
situation. 95
In a recent case, Horn v. Cooley," the appellate division, third
department, reversed special term, Schenectady County, and granted
defendant's motion to dismiss under 3216, on the ground of
"general delay." While no 45 day demand was served, the fact
that a note of issue was filed, and the circumstance of inordinate
delay in prosecution-since 1960-demanded a dismissal despite
the lack of demand.
In light of 3216's amendment in 1967, which would require
a written demand under the facts of the instant case, practitioner
should be aware, that the third department is apparently not applying 3216 retroactively-and to that extent, is now following the
first department.97
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser doctrine no longer followed in first
department.
Gkser v. Huette9 8 established the rule that co-defendants in a
prior action are precluded from using collateral estoppel defensively
against each other in a subsequent action because they were not
adversaries in the prior action. Since there was no duty to defend
against each other in the former action, they can relitigate the issue
of negligence as between themselves in a later action.
In recent years, technical requirements for the defensive use
of collateral estoppel have been liberalized by the Court of Appeals.
03This requirement became effective on September 1, 1967. 3216, as
originally enacted, did not require any demand. The 1964 amendment added
a demand requirement, but that amendment was repealed when the present
amendment was enacted.
4For a discussion of this problem, see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216,
supp. commentary 311-16 (1967).
95 CPLR 3216(b) (3) provides that a court may not take any initiative
and no motion shall be made until a written demand is served upon plaintiff.
The rigidity of this requirement is strengthened somewhat by the express
denomination of this procedure as a "condition precedent."
CPLR 3216(d) provides that where a note of issue has been filed, with
or without demand, the court cannot consider any delay prior to the filing
of the note of issue.
96 30 App. Div. Zd 729, 291 N.Y.S.2d 549 (3d Dep't 1968).
97 For a discussion of the conflict regarding the retroactive application
of 3216, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 302, 330 (1968); 43 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 142, 159 (1968); 42 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 438, 456 (1968).
9s232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd vinem., 256 N.Y.
686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
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In Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.,9 it was held that, where the issues
in a prior and subsequent suit were identical and where the party
against whom the defense was being asserted had had his day in
court on the issues, defensive use of collateral estoppel could be
interposed. The mutuality requirement was thus, presumably,
abandoned. 100 However, in cases involving joint tortfeasors, the
New York courts have continued to follow Glaser, without considering the "identity of issues plus opportunity to be heard" test. 0 1
It is arguable that the Glaser doctrine was further eroded by a
recent Court of Appeals decision, Cummings v. Dresher.'02 There,
P-1 (passenger in car number 1) and D-1 (driver of car number 1)
sued D-2 (driver of car number 2) for personal injuries. P-1
recovered, but D-I lost because the jury found him guilty of contributory negligence. However, the jury made a gratuitous finding
that D-2 was guilty of negligence as against 1)-1. In a subsequent
action by D-2 against D-1, D-1 was permitted to interpose the
defense of collateral estoppel, i.e., D-2's negligence as established
by the prior action was equivalent to a finding of contributory
negligence in this action. The ratio decidendi was that where the
issues are the same and both litigants were parties to the first
action, there is no reason to relitigate the issues.
In a recent case, Schwartz v. Public Administrator,'0 3 the
appellate division, first department, held that Gloser is no longer
a viable precedent and can no longer be followed. 104 D-1 (owner and operator of car 1) and D-2 (owner of car 2), codefendants, lost a personal injury action brought by passengers
in car 1. In the instant action, D-1 sued D-2 for personal injuries.
D-2 sought to set up the defense of collateral estoppel, on the
ground that D-1 could only recover upon a showing of freedom
from contributory negligence, whereas the prior action conclusively
1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel is based on the principle that
a party who is a stranger to an action is not bound by its outcome. Therefore, since nonparties and nonprivies are not bound by the outcome they
should not be able to benefit from it. See H. WAcamRI., NEW YoRM
PRAcTicE UNDER THE CPLR 347-48 (2d ed. 1966).
101See, e.g., Minkoff v. Brenner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 222
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1962); Grande v. Torello, 12 App. Div. 2d 937, 210 N.Y.S.2d
562 (2d Dep't 1961); Friedman v. Salvatti, 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201
N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1960). See also The Quarterly Survey of New
York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 128, 152 (1967); 42 ST. JoHies L.
R-v. 436, 462 (1968); H. WAcHNT=l, NEw YoRa PRAcricm UxNER THE
CPLR 347-49 (2d ed. 1966).
102 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
'1330 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1968).
104Justice Rabin, with whom Justice McGivern concurred, dissented on
the ground that Glaser has never been overruled and the appellate division
is, therefore, bound by its holding until such time as the Court of Appeals
chooses to expressly overrule it.
99
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established his negligence as a cause of the accident. Special term,
relying on Glaser, held that D-1's cause of action was not barred
by the prior adjudication. The appellate division reversed, holding
that
the Glaser case should no longer be blindly followed as a controlling
precedent. Recent decisions in the Court of Appeals give clear indication that Glaser may not be accepted as an authority under the present
day application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.10 5
It was found that the prior action included a determination of
whether or not D-1 caused or contributed to the collision, and that
implicit in the jury's verdict was a finding that D-1 was negligent.
Under these circumstances, the court felt that the defensive application of collateral estoppel was fair and just.
Where the issues involved in an action were previously fully
litigated, and the parties are the same, there is no reason to relitigate those issues. In light of recent Court of Appeals activity
in the field of collateral estoppel, the holding in Schwartz is not
surprising.
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser doctrine retained in second department.
The rule of Glaserv. Huette '10 will continue to be applied in the
second department. In a recent case, Higginbothom v. Rath,07 D-1
and D-2 (owner and operator of car 1) were awarded a verdict for
property damage and personal injuries against D-3 and D-4 (owner
and operator of car 2), in a prior action. In the instant action,
plaintiff (passenger in car 1) sued all four defendants for personal
injuries. D-1 and D-2 moved for leave to serve an amended
answer setting up the affirmative defense of res judicata, on the
ground that, in the prior action, the issue of negligence on the part
of the drivers had been decided. The motion was granted, but the
merits of the defense were left for adjudication in the trial court.
Subsequently, D-3 and D-4 moved to strike out the affirmative
defense, but special term denied the motion on the ground that
movants had no standing to question the sufficiency of a defense in
their co-defendants' answer addressed to the complaint.
As stated by the appellate division, here, the general rule in
cases involving joint tortfeasors is that, prior to judgment and
prior to the time when the issue of contribution becomes directly
relevant, one defendant is not aggrieved by a determination in favor

10530
1o8232

App. Div. 2d at 195, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd tnem., 256 N.Y.

686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
10730 App. Div. 2d 93, 289 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2d Dept 1969).

